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Abstract
This article builds a model of financial frictions to explain the aftermath
of natural disasters. In constrained economies, after a large shock on capital,
affected entrepreneurs might lose access to credit together with their stock of
capital. Investment does not flow to high-returns projects. Accordingly, in con-
strained economies, a shock on capital is associated with an initial decrease of
domestic credit and an investment slack. I find direct support for the theoret-
ical model using objective measures on sudden natural disasters between 1980
and 2006. Constrained economies experience an initial decline in their level of
investment, which reflects on the immediate GDP growth. This effect fades
away after 3 years. In frictionless environment, the increase of credit offsets
almost perfectly the estimated capital losses. The underlying credit frictions
computed using a structural equation prove to be correlated to more classic
measures of financial development.
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I. Introduction
In credit-rationed environments, misallocations of resources across production units
might persist. This feature has already been established by a literature using firm-
level dataset1. Large natural calamities destroy physical capital and, in financially
underdeveloped environments, the induced distortion may not be immediately ab-
sorbed by credit markets.
A natural disaster should be followed by a credit expansion in order to restore
the pre-catastrophe level of capital. There is a risk of double penalty in the wake of a
large natural calamity: in addition to capital losses, entrepreneurs may lose collateral
up to the point where access to credit become restricted. The investment of those
highly productive units will be temporarily lower than their ideal level. This paper
builds upon the observation that the recovery period following a natural disaster
can be long even for apparently fast-growing countries and relates this inertia to the
presence of credit constraints.
I model a simple dynamic economy of infinite-horizon agents with heterogeneous
endowments and financial frictions. From this stylized framework, I derive the de-
terministic evolution of the distribution of capital, consumption, credit and interest
rate in a closed form system of equations. The intuition behind the model is fairly
straightforward: in the wake of a shock, some entrepreneurs will be denied access to
credit and thus maintain an activity far below its ideal level. I test the predictions
of the model on a unique dataset of cyclones and earthquakes between 1980 and
2006. The dataset relies on wind trails and tremors weighted by the local density of
population and provides precise and objective measures of the distribution of capital
losses for each event.
Matching these occurrences with macroeconomic indicators on a large panel of
countries, I find direct support for the theoretical predictions. Credit constraints
account for a large part of the inertia following cyclones and earthquakes. Coun-
tries exhibiting larger credit market frictions catch up at a slower pace with the
1see McKenzie for an analysis on small businesses following the 2004 tsunami and Manova [2008]
for indirect evidence in Guatemala.
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initial growth path. This result is the consequence of a credit squeeze of significant
magnitude in constrained economies. At the other end of the spectrum, frictionless
economies experience an increase of the loans provided to the private sector which
offsets the estimated capital losses. The differential response to the shock between
countries is largely explained by this dimension. The estimation of a structural
equation derived by the theory is compatible with a model of credit rationing with
higher inertia for countries with an under-developed financial sector. The struc-
tural equation relates the delay of investment to underlying credit frictions. The
amplitude of credit frictions as predicted by the aftermaths of catastrophes are very
correlated with long-horizon measures of financial development.
Despite being labeled as rare events, natural catastrophes are frequent in a large
panel of countries. Regions2 lying on major irregularities of a fault trace regularly
experience tremors and associated tsunamis. Countries bordering the West-Pacific
basin and the Atlantic basin suffer on a yearly basis from the passage of hurri-
canes and typhoons. In a nutshell, a very heterogeneous panel of countries is often
concerned by natural calamities of large amplitude.
The catastrophe risk should be factored into decision-making in risky-prone ar-
eas. Theoretically, some instruments may alleviate the aftermath of a natural dis-
aster. Insurance, aid contributions and debt rescheduling might provide ex-post
resources. In practice, insurance is almost absent in the subsample of developing
and under-developed countries. In addition, reimbursements concern mainly capi-
tal losses and does not mitigate losses from business disruption and indirect losses.
Similarly, international assistance mainly provides immediate relief and neglects re-
construction or economic upturn. As such, countries in the wake of a shock first and
foremost rely on reserves, debt relief and austerity plans.
These past few decades, human losses due to natural disasters have decreased
quite substantially while economic damages have hovered, if not slightly increased.
In parallel, an increasing attention has been devoted to direct damages and, more
importantly, economic repercussions of natural disasters. Natural disasters might
2United States, Central America, Chile, Ecuador, Bolivia, Japan, China, Philippines, Indonesia,
India, Pakistan, Iran, central Asia, Turkey, Greece are close to the more risky-prone areas.
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move some countries away from their growth path. Despite the existence of studies
dedicated to the economic consequences of natural disasters, no definite answers
have emerged from the academic dispute. Countries with better institutions tend
to suffer less from huge capital losses [Noy, 2009] and are able to maintain their
level of trade [Gassebner et al., 2006]. Among the keys to success stands finan-
cial development. Economies with a higher level of private credit are less prone
to economic disruption. On the other hand, a country subject to frequent natural
disasters benefits from a creative destruction process passing through R&D embod-
ied in importations (Cuaresma et al. [2008] and Skidmore & Toya [2002]). To sum
up, even for countries with bad institutions, the empirical findings are not very
conclusive. Two stumbling blocks might explain the difficulty to identify common
patterns following disasters. First, the explanatory power of reduced-form specifica-
tions suffers from the large heterogeneity across countries in the response to shocks.
Second, data on natural disasters come mainly from declarations and reports, and
induce biases when reported in addition to important truncations. As highlighted
in Zylberberg [2010], the estimated amplitude of the economic disruption increases
significantly when instrumenting the declarations of losses by objective measures.
A low elasticity of economic shock to capital losses could then simply reflect cen-
sored declarations for the most affected economies, illustrating either an interest in
concealing real exposure or simply a higher degree of seclusion.
The present paper focuses on shocks whose frequencies and amplitudes wedge
into the space between classical productivity shocks and long-horizon convergence
processes. This study is caught between the short-term3 and the long-horizon4
analysis.
To my knowledge, this project is the first paper focusing on misallocation of
3A huge strand of literature has used credit imperfections to understand business cycles. With
no attempt at an exhaustive description, Bernanke & Gertler [1989], Bernanke et al. [1999] and
Kiyotaki & Moore [1997] have pointed out the importance of credit frictions in the propagation of
short-term shocks. Finally, Matsuyama et al. [2007] tries to reconcile both approaches.
4Regarding transition and development issues, Banerjee et al. [2005] provides a comprehensive
review of the literature. This literature builds upon the seminal papers of Hall & Jones [1999],
Piketty [1997] or Banerjee & Newman [1994]. More recently, Jeong & Townsend [2008] and Buera
[2009] have tried to direct their attention to quantitative issues and calibrate their model on some
transition economies.
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resources after large natural disasters. The model is inspired by the quantitative-
oriented literature on credit frictions, and aims at giving testable predictions for
the empirical estimation. Accordingly, the model and its extensions can be solved
in a closed-form recursion. The key ingredients which allow to alleviate the clas-
sical problems with heterogeneous agents - path-dependency, aggregation and the
characterization of the steady-state distribution - are the following. Agents are only
heterogeneous in their endowments. The CARA specification and the absence of un-
certainty generates very simple individual dynamics. Even with those assumptions,
the aggregate dynamics is complicated to characterize when agents differ in their
capital endowment. The last restriction on the model imposes that an economy in
the aftermath of a catastrophe is initially populated by only two kinds of agents - the
unhappy few with a very low endowment and the happy lot. The unhappy few are
infinitesimal, Taylor style, and the dynamics can then be approached at first-order.
This assumption allows me to derive an approximation of the aggregate dynamics
as if (i) the unhappy few were credit-constrained but under steady-state prices, (ii)
the happy lot are unconstrained but under-accumulate because of a higher interest
rate than the steady-sate rate. Intuitively, responses are first-order for the major-
ity of agents close to the steady-state and zero-order for the few agents displaced
far below the steady-state. The theoretical framework borrows some features from
Matsuyama et al. [2007], Buera [2009], Buera & Shin [2010], Angeletos & Calvet
[2006], Krusell & Smith [1998], Quadrini [2000] and Greenwood et al. [2007], de-
spite being simpler to a certain extent than any of them. Naturally, simplicity has
its drawbacks. I consider here costly enforcement problems without any particular
mechanism in mind. As such, I rule out - and this is rather ad-hoc - the existence of
more complicated and sophisticated instruments or debt contracts. Besides, agents
are not heterogeneous in their productivity, which could theoretically encompass the
ability to mitigate against natural disasters. Finally, the natural disaster is mod-
eled as an unanticipated shock driving a small proportion of agents away from the
steady-state. I disregard preemptive behaviors as regards the occurrences of natural
disasters, agents do not over-accumulate in order to smoothen future bad shocks.
The present paper estimates the influence of very large fluctuations over a large
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number of events. A non-trivial empirical contribution of the present project is that
it hinges on accurate and objective data on cyclone trails and earthquake tremors.
Whereas studies drawing on reports from officials might be biased by misreports and
censorships, the present paper alleviates both issues. More importantly, the dataset
disaggregates a large event into many local impacts. For any given threshold, I can
approach the proportion of the population affected by at least this level of energy.
Going back to the theoretical framework, I can determine how many5 agents can be
labeled as the unhappy few and relate directly the theoretical predictions with the
empirics.
I present in section II. the theoretical framework and the evolution of macroe-
conomic aggregates as predicted by the model. I then discuss the strategies to
construct a consistent dataset in section III.. The section IV. presents the empirical
strategies and results. Extended results also are discussed in this section, focusing
on a method to extract the underlying parameters related to credit rationing.
II. Theoretical model
In this section, I will describe the theoretical model. This model needs important
features, the economy is a closed economy, there are no aggregate uncertainty (shocks
are initial disturbances to the steady state) and agents are similar in every respect
but their endowments. The theoretical part is organized as follows. I describe a
standard Bewley model with infinitely-lived agents. I then characterize a degener-
ated steady state and study the importance of the initial distribution of capital and
financial frictions in the convergence to the steady state. Finally, I illustrate the
theoretical intuition with an analysis of impulse responses and propose a testable
prediction of the model.
5a priori an infinitesimal proportion.
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A. Hypotheses
The closed economy is composed of a mass of infinitely-lived agents. These agents are
heterogeneous in terms of wealth but equally efficient at generating surpluses from
the entrepreneurial activity or supplying efficient units of labor to their own firm.
The economy is entirely deterministic6. Let us denote wt the wealth of entrepreneur
and w 7→ Ft(w) the distribution of wealth in the whole country at date t.
Entrepreneurs generate an income from their activity f (kit), depending only on
capital inputs kit. Importantly, I assume decreasing returns to scale, which create,
in constrained economies, a gap between the ability to produce surpluses and the
actual surpluses7.
As is common in these incomplete markets frameworks, I consider that only
non-contingent instruments are traded. Agents can buy a quantity θit of bonds
at period t with an interest rate rt paid in t + 1. Insurance, cat bonds or any-
kind of assets indexed on realizations of state of nature are excluded in this non-
stochastic economy. Their existence in practice could attenuate the amplitude of
initial disparities between affected and non-affected households/firms. Considering
the market penetration of those contingent contracts in developing countries, this
assumption is not utterly unreasonable. The assumption that agents borrow from
one period to the next is more restrictive. More importantly, I do not model credit
supply outside the country and assume it fixed and independent of credit constraints.
The entrepreneur takes the interest rate rt in the economy as given.
Let me detail some additional notations here. The only good in the economy
can be consumed or used for production. Once an entrepreneur has rescheduled her
debt, she can invest or consume ct. Each agent maximizes her discounted utility
derived from their consumption path. The utility function u(.) is a CARA function
u(c) = −e−c/γ, and is the same for everyone.
Let us turn to the credit frictions. Credit constraints arise from the impossibility
for the investors to ensure contract enforcement in t+1. At reimbursement date, the
entrepreneur can indeed reimburse the amount specified in the contract or default
6Not only the aggregate dynamics is deterministic but also each individual dynamics.
7Marginal returns to a unit of capital will be higher for agents with few capital.
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and flight with a part κ of the collateral. The part of collateral seized by the investor
following a default is useless for them. As a consequence, the investors have no ex-
post incentives to seize the capital and a renegotiation of the terms of the contract
would be optimal for both parties. I assume that the investors can commit not to
renegotiate the contract. There is no need for information asymmetry between the
investors and the entrepreneurs about the real level of damaged capital and this
latter characteristic will be common knowledge. Considering that agents can use
their capital as collateral, the condition under which a default will occur specifies
that instantaneous gain from deviation should be high enough:
(1 + rt)θt + kt+1 > (1− κ)kt+1
In this model, default is not considered as possible. Credit constraints will thus
translate directly into a limit to the amount of debt required. Entrepreneurs can
borrow up to the limit where they are willing to reimburse the amount specified in
the contract. For simplicity, I omit the influence of the present interest rate on the
credit constraint. This assumption can be made without loss of generality as long
as we consider first-order approximations for the aggregate dynamics.
θt ≥ −κkt+1
B. Individual optimization
Consider Vt (kt, θt−1) the value function derived from the individual optimization at
date t for an agent inheriting (kt, θt−1) from period t − 1. The agent i maximizes
the following program - where the superscript i is omitted:
Vt (kt, θt−1) = max(kt+1,ct,θt) {u (ct) + βVt+1 (kt+1, θt)}
s.t
 θt ≥ −κkt+1 (CC)θt + kt+1 + ct ≤ f (kt) + (1− δ) kt + (1 + rt−1)θt−1 (BC)
(M)
The concavity of the utility function ensures that the Slater conditions are verified
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and the set of feasible allocations is non-empty as the no-debt contract does not bind
the constraint (CC). The solution of the method of Lagrange multipliers generalized
to inequality constraints is thus optimal following Karush-Kuhn-Tucker.
Proposition II..1. The Euler equation can be written as follows:
ct = ct+1 − γ ln (β(1 + r∗t ))
where
r∗t = rt +
f
′
(kt+1)− δ − rt
1− κ
When the credit constraint binds, θt = −κkt+1, otherwise, f ′ (kt+1) = rt + δ.
Proof. The computations are developed in the appendix.
Looking at the Euler equation, the credit constraints induce agents to smoothen
their consumption at the effective returns on savings, a weighted sum of the marginal
productivity of capital and the interest rate. In that respect, constrained agents
decide to consume relatively less today as the returns on savings is higher for them
than for unconstrained agents. This behavior tends to accelerate the process of
capital accumulation.
C. Market clearing condition and steady state
The entrepreneurs are the only agents of the closed economy. Consequently, the
equilibrium will be defined by the following conditions:
Definition II..1. The equilibrium will be characterized by the individual and deter-
ministic sequences
{
θit, k
i
t+1, c
i
t
}
t
and a deterministic sequence {rt}t of interest rates
such that:
First,
{
θit, k
i
t+1, c
i
t
}
t
should solve the maximization program (M) for agent i; sec-
ond, the market price {rt}t should be fixed such as to clear the bond market:∫ ∞
0
θitdi = 0
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Intuitively, a steady state of this economy is very simple to characterize. In such
a deterministic environment, the dynamics can be considered as monotonous, i.e. a
drift of one of the state variable for one agent can not be compensated by a reverse
drift for another agent. In short, an agent with a higher wealth will keep a higher
wealth next period. Accordingly, a fixed point for the whole distribution needs to
be a fixed point for almost each agent.
Proposition II..2. A steady state is a fixed point for the distribution of (ki, r) in
the economy and is characterized for every agent by the following equations: r∞ + δ = f
′
(k∞)
β (1 + r∞) = 1
Proof. In the appendix.
Infinitely-lived agents will deprive themselves and grow out of the credit trap.
Once unconstrained, they are able to build the optimal level of capital - which hap-
pens to be the same for every agent in this stylized economy. Any initial distribution
of capital degenerates into a point distribution. The reallocation of resources is op-
timal and credit does not play a role in the aggregate economy. As a consequence,
unsurprisingly, the returns to capital are equal to the inverse of the discount factor
and the capital stock is determined independently of the wealth distribution.
D. Aggregate dynamics and convergence
Let me study now the properties of the dynamic economy as a function of the initial
distribution of wealth and the degree of credit constraints in the economy. To this
purpose, I will consider a post-catastrophe version of this economy. At t = 0, the
economy is composed of only two types of agents8, the happy lot and the unhappy
few in proportion µ.
8The results derived in this section accommodate other initial distributions of wealth. The
main assumption - which can not be relaxed - is the infinitesimal size of losers. Relaxing it would
essentially impede any closed-form resolution.
10
The initial wealth of the affected agents will be ω and the wealth of unaffected
entrepreneurs will be the steady-state wealth ω∞.
In order to solve the dynamic program under these initial conditions, I will con-
sider a Taylor approximation at first order in µ. The usual approximations around a
steady state consist in linearizations of a representative-agent program. Here, some
agents are very far from the absorbing steady-state. Accordingly, a linearization of
their individual dynamics is inconceivable. Nonetheless, as they are supposed to be
an infinitesimal fraction of the overall population, an approximation at first-order
can be described as follows; (i) the unhappy few may be credit-constrained but con-
sider the steady-state prices and do not infer how their choices may affect market
prices, (ii) the happy lot are driven away from the steady-state by the actions of the
unhappy lot but their dynamics is still in the close neighborhood of this steady state.
The resolution of the dynamics will illustrate this intuition. First, I will solve the
dynamics for the “small economy” composed of the unhappy few under fixed prices.
Second, I will incorporate the perturbation induced by the choices of the unhappy
few in the program of the happy lot as an external shock. Finally, I will describe
the world dynamics incorporating both components.
In a first instance, let us consider the dynamics of the unhappy few. The following
lemma is key and drives the aggregate dynamics. Define for simplicity k∞ and r∞: k∞ = f
′−1(1−β
β
+ δ)
r∞ =
1−β
β
Lemma II..3. The dynamics can be characterized by the following recursion. First,
consider the last period τ for which the agents are constrained. For every period t
after τ , kt+1 = k∞. At period τ ,
(1− κ)kτ+1 + c0(w(kτ+1))− γ ln
(
1 +
β
1− κ(f
′
(kτ+1)− f ′(k∞))
)
= w(kτ ) (Ro)
with c0(w(kτ+1)) = w∞ + r∞1+r∞w(kτ+1) and w : x 7→ [(1− δ)− (1 + r∞)κ]x+ f(x).
Then, the dynamics can be defined iterating backward with kτ−(n+1) and kτ−n
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related by the following equation where cn(w(kτ−n)) = w(kτ−n)− kτ−n+1.
(1− κ)kτ−n + cn(w(kτ−n))− γ ln
(
1 +
β
1− κ(f
′
(kτ−n)− f ′(k∞))
)
= w(kτ−(n+1))
(Rn)
Proof. In the appendix.
The dynamics reveals difficult to characterize in this general case. One of the rea-
son comes from the fact that agents’ choices are dependent on their past (backward-
looking) but also on the anticipated consumption path (forward-looking). A simple
way to keep tractability is to impose a constraint for consumption. If we add the
constraint that consumption should be bounded to 0 and can not be negative, the
dynamics may become simpler. The dynamics then consists in 3 segments, a first
segment in which agents are credit-constrained and willing to maintain a consump-
tion equal to 0 so as to grow out of those constraints, a second segment where they
are still constrained but consume following an arbitrage between starvation and cap-
ital misallocation, and a third segment in which they are not constrained anymore.
The following lemma imposes a condition (H) which ensures that agents will deprive
themselves up to the point where they are unconstrained, i.e. the second segment
disappears.
Lemma II..4. Under the condition that
w∞+
r∞
1 + r∞
(1−κ)k∞−γ ln
(
1 +
β
1− κ(f
′
(w−1 ((1− κ)k∞))− f ′(k∞))
)
< 0 (H)
the dynamics can be expressed as follows:
(1− κ)kt+1 = w(kt)
as long as w(kt) < (1− κ)k∞ and kt+1 = k∞ once w(kt) ≥ (1− κ)k∞.
Proof. This proposition is directly derived from the previous lemma. Under the
condition (H), the consumption predicted by lemma II..3 will be negative for the
last period for which agents are constrained. The constraint imposes then that it will
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be equal to 0. Going backward, the Euler equation imposes then that consumption
will be nil for all periods before.
Now, let us consider the first-order response of the happy lot to a shock on
the credit markets. Denoting Θt = −µ((1 + r)θt−1 + θt) where θ stands for the
bond holdings of the unhappy few, Θt can be understood as the shock induced by
their sudden demand for fundings. The response of the rest of the economy can be
modeled as follows.
Lemma II..5. Denote x˜ the distance of the variable x to its steady state value. The
dynamics of unaffected agents can be approached at first order by the following set
of equations: 
c˜t + k˜t+1 = (1 + r∞)k˜t +Θt
k˜t+1 = −η∞r˜t
c˜t = c˜t+1 − γr˜t
where η∞ = −1/f ′′
(
f
′−1 (r∞ + δ)
)
.
Proof. In the appendix.
Following a shock on very few agents, the aggregate dynamics can be approached
by the zero-order evolution of the small country and the first-order response of the
bigger country. The following proposition is a direct application of the previous
lemmas.
Proposition II..6. Consider the aforementioned distribution of wealth at period 0
- a very small proportion µ of agent inherits ω from the past while a proportion
1 − µ inherits the steady-state endowment. X˜ stands for the distance of X from
its steady-state value. Denote k the capital accumulation of affected agents which
constitutes the separate process described in lemma II..3. The dynamics is entirely
determined by the following system: C˜t + K˜t+1 = (1 + r∞)K˜t − εt−1C˜t = C˜t+1 + γη∞ K˜t+1 + µt
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where εt−1 and µt are disturbances relatively to the benchmark dynamics and ι is a
dummy equal to 0 if the 0-bound for consumption is reached as described in lemma
II..4.  εt−1 = −µ
[
f(kt)− f(k∞)− f ′(k∞)(kt − k∞)
]
µt = −µ
[
γ ln
(
1 + β
1−κ(f
′
(kt+1)− f ′(k∞))
)
ι+ γ
η∞ (kt+1 − k∞)
]
Proof. In the appendix.
This proposition states that the recovery will be quicker in unconstrained economies
relatively to constrained economies. Naturally, this closed form recursion relies heav-
ily on the fact that affected agents do not internalize the response of unaffected
agents at first order. In particular, the condition under which the economy follows
a representative-agent dynamics does not depend on the proportion of affected peo-
ple (as long as it remains small). The role of the infinitesimal assumption can be
understood as follows. Few Martians arrive on an Earth stabilized for ages at its
steady-state. They are sufficiently small not to modify, from their point of view,
the Earth economy. Accordingly, they behave as if they were at the steady-state
but with low endowments. The condition under which the aggregate dynamics is
representative-agent relies on the possibility for each individual - the fact that they
are a group does not matter - to reach a representative-agent allocation. This capac-
ity only depends on the distance between the steady-state endowment and theirs.
In that sense, for a given wealth shock and as long as the proportion of outliers are
small, the aggregate dynamics will be the further from the unconstrained dynamics
for very intense shocks on very few people. Conversely, small differences between
the two populations will be immediately absorbed.
The error term in the first equation can be understood as the cost on the aggre-
gate wealth of imperfections driving some agents away from the optimal path. Two
effects of credit constraints can be emphasized on the second equation, (i) the capital
accumulation effect, (ii) the consumption-smoothing effect. The ideal demand for
capital should increase but the effective demand for capital is limited by the borrow-
ing constraints affecting the needy entrepreneurs. Basically, the interest rate will
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not rise as much as it should be in a frictionless economy and some entrepreneurs
will over-consume while others will under-invest compared to the counterfactual of
the unconstrained credit markets. This under-accumulation of capital implies that
the effective interest rate will be quite high for constrained agents. They mitigate
this initial behavior by reducing their consumption today. Both effects wash away
as soon as the unhappy few grow out of credit constraints and catch-up with the
unconstrained dynamics.
E. Simulations and predictions
Let us analyze the shape of the impulse response predicted by the theoretical model.
Building upon the proposition II..6, the system of equations can be written as follows:
X˜t+1 =
 1 + r∞ −1
−(1 + r∞) γη∞ 1 +
γ
η∞
 X˜t + χt
where X˜t =
 K˜t
C˜t
 is the vector of endogeneous variables, and χt =
 −εt−1
µt +
γ
η∞ εt−1

the disturbance implied by the existence of financial frictions.
This model can be solved quite easily by iterating backward to relate to the
initial capital and forward to converge to the steady state. Figure 1 illustrates the
impulse responses of a set of different economies, the benchmark economy for which
κ ∼ 1, a set of slightly constrained economies and the heavily constrained economy
κ ∼ 0. As put into evidence by the comparison of these responses, the catching-
up process is slower in constrained economies and investment comes later in the
aftermaths of the catastrophe than in the benchmark case. With the calibration
chosen here, the indirect shock is quite smaller than the direct shock. Accordingly,
for readibility concerns, I subtract for each trajectory the benchmark trajectory and
plot the evolution of the indirect slack net of the direct effect in figure 2. The
distance between the optimal trajectory and the constrained trajectory reaches a
peak slightly after the shock and converges slowly to zero. The area between the
curves and the horizontal axis gives a good idea of the extent to which an economy
15
is credit constrained.
Figure 1: Evolution of capital after a shock µ = 1%, w = 0.1w∞ on a set of different
economies. Calibrated on the basis of an annual frequency with f(k) = kα, δ = .1,
β = .96, α = .5, and γ = 1.
Coming back once again to the proposition II..6, the dynamic system can be
written as follows:  C˜t + K˜t+1 = (1 + r∞)K˜t − εt−1C˜t = C˜t+1 + γη∞ K˜t+1 + µt
Differentiating the first equation and subtracting with the second one bring imme-
diately:
∆K˜t+1,t+2 = r∞∆K˜t,t+1 +
γ
η∞
K˜t + µt−1 −∆εt−1,t
This equation specifies that investment is delayed in subsequent periods once con-
trolled for current investment in the case of a shock occurring at period t. In other
words, the more constrained the economy and the larger the delay in the response
of investment. As µt−1 − ∆εt−1,t is proportional to the degree of exposure of the
economy µ and depends on the moment t0 when the shock has struck the economy,
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Figure 2: Evolution of capital compared to the benchmark evolution without fric-
tions after a shock µ = 1%, w = 0.1w∞ on a set of different economies. Calibrated
with δ = .1, β = .96, α = .5, and γ = 1.
the previous equation can be directly tested as follows:
∆K˜it+1,t+2 = ζ∆K˜
i
t,t+1 + ζkK˜
i
t + ζ
i
eE
i
t0
+ νit
where ζ ie is the parameter of interest as a function of credit frictions κ in country i,
t − 1 and the date of occurrence t0, and Eit0 can be approached by the percentage
of exposed agents in the country i when hit by the catastrophe. Note that ζ ie does
not depend on the proportion of agents exposed but only on the extent to which
they are exposed. The empirical construction will hinge on this hypothesis, extract
for each economy an estimation of ζ ie and relate it with financial constraints. A
graphical interpretation is given in figure 3: ζ ie is proportional, at period t for a
shock occurring at t = 0, to the area between t and t + 1. Averaging this equation
over all the potential shocks having occurred before t− 1,
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∆K˜it+1,t+2 = ζ∆K˜
i
t,t+1 + ζkK˜
i
t + Et0 [ζ ieEit0 ] + ν
i
t
Along the aftermaths of the shock, the estimation of Et0 [ζ ieEit0 ] then captures the
average area above the curve shown in figure 3 (a linear combination of ε’s and µ’s).
Figure 3: Illustration of ζ ieEit0 and Et0 [ζ
i
eE
i
t0
] as areas above the evolution of con-
strained economies.
III. Description of the data
In this paper, I will only detail the construction of the distribution of capital losses
for each event. The careful reader might refer to Zylberberg [2010] for a panorama
of the data sources and the construction of the local objective indicators of natural
destructive power based on the local density of population.
I construct not only the first moment but also the heterogeneity of exposure
across the population. In particular and this is relevant for applying the previous
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theoretical framework, I can determine how much of the population of a country is
affected by a certain threshold of energy.
The following section describes the construction of local measures of exposure
and the aggregation method to construct catastrophe observations then country/year
entries. In a second part, I give descriptive statistics on exposed countries and the
average shock studied here.
A. Construction of the datasets
At first order, the amplitude of economic damages following a natural calamity in
a certain zone ζ might be explained by three concurrent factors: the pure natural
threat (the energy dissipated by the wind or seismic tremors), the economic assets
at stake (accounting mainly for the physical capital but also for human capital) and
the vulnerability of those assets (mitigation, prevention...).
A local measure of exposure
To simplify the analysis, for a catastrophe c in an area ζ, I will construct two proxies
at a very disaggregated level for (i) the physical exposure Ec(ζ) and (ii) the quantity
of assets at stake Ac(ζ).
For reasons of consistency between earthquakes and wind-based events, I rely on
the energy dissipated in a certain area as a proxy for the physical exposure Ec(ζ) =
ec(ζ). As it is not possible to derive exactly the pressure exerted by a typhoon or
an earthquake on buildings, infrastructures, crops, the energy dissipated is the best
alternative to estimate potential economic direct damages. These estimates need to
be interacted with the economic activity at stake (ideally the physical productive
capital). This quantity of assets will be approached by the local density of population
Ac(ζ) = de(ζ). This indicator is the only variable standing for economic activity and
available at such a disaggregated level.
With these two proxies (available for each area of approximately 25 kms × 30
kms crossed by a catastrophe), I construct
• the energy interpolated with by the local economic activity, ec(ζ)de(ζ) for a
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particular area ζ and
∫
ec(ζ)de(ζ)dζ along the whole catastrophe, both nor-
malized by the country population.
• economic activity exposed to at least a certain threshold of energy e¯, 1ec(ζ)≥e¯de(ζ)
for a particular area τ and
∫
1ec(ζ)≥e¯de(ζ)dζ along the whole catastrophe, still
normalized by the country population. The thresholds will be chosen as equiv-
alents of the categories given to tropical typhoons by NOAA (from tropical
storm, which will be assigned to e¯0 to category 5 typhoons which will be as-
signed to e¯5.). Similarly, for earthquakes, the thresholds will be chosen such
as to match the Richter scale and energy at the epicenter of a magnitude 5.5
(e¯0), 6 (e¯1), 6.5 (e¯2), 7 (e¯3), 7.5 (e¯4), 8 (e¯5) earthquake.
As the analysis will be led in relative terms, this construction does not assume
economic activity per capita to be at the same level over the entire globe. Instead,
the implicit assumption is that, in a given country, economic activity per capita does
not depend on the density of population9.
Figure 4 gives tan idea of how these indices are constructed using the example
of cyclone Hary, passing through Madagascar in 2002. The lines represent level sets
along which the wind is constant.
Briefly, Katrina (2005) was comparable to a dozen of tropical typhoons having
affected Japan during the past decades both along the intensity and assets-at-stake
dimensions. Mitigation and prevention go a long way into explaining the fact that
Katrina has been more costly than all the tropical typhoons having landed on Japan
over the last decade. Unfortunately, the vulnerability factor evoked in the preamble
of this section remains mainly unobserved. A good indicator might be the penetra-
tion of private insurance. On the one hand, insurance companies are risk-averse and
require a certain level of prevention and building regulations before setting up their
activity durably in a country. On the other hand, the very presence of those firms
gives the incentives for insurees to alleviate their exposure to large risk and reduce
significantly the risk premia. This assumption imposes that the only disparity in
mitigation mechanisms within a country come from the differences in exposure to
9this statement is likely to be violated, but accounting for a slight increase of economic activity
per capita as a function of the density of population does not change the results.
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Figure 4: Example for the construction of exposure - cyclone Hary (2002). The
proportions of agents affected by e¯0, e¯1, e¯2, e¯3, e¯4 are respectively .88, .42, .18, .06,
0.
natural disasters. It is indeed sensible to see different levels of prevention in risky-
prone areas than in safe zones. The regional exposure might provide a seemingly
unbiased (but imprecise) measure of the regional vulnerability within a country.
Finally, I complement the objective measures with reports on immediate losses
- mainly direct capital losses. EM-DAT10 is constructed using reports either from
government officials or NGOs. The dataset will essentially fulfill the function of
validity check for the constructed measures.
10EM-DAT: The OFDA/CRED International Disaster Database (www.emdat.be), Université
Catholique de Louvain.
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The aggregate measure of exposure
In order to match the macroeconomic datasets, I consider the annualized energy
indexes constructed above and sum over all the catastrophes having occurred in a
certain country i at a certain date t. In practice, I will weight each catastrophe
by the number of months for which each catastrophe may have contributed to the
output loss in the ongoing year i.e. the number of months between the catastrophe
and the end of the year. I will add earthquakes and cyclones as apples and oranges.
To be more precise, I treat the same way and aggregate assets destroyed by quakes
of a certain category and cyclones of the “same” category. Once again, I invite the
reader interested in how quakes may differ from cyclones to report to Zylberberg
[2010] in which the differential impacts of those two events are documented along the
different thresholds. The results presented here are robust to geological and wind
events taken separately. In addition to the actual events, I create for each country
at each point in time their expected losses assuming the stationarity of the natural
threat distribution. This measure allows me to capture a potential response of the
economy to its vulnerability rather than actual shocks and changes in exposure
due to changes in densities of population in risky areas. It could play a role as
the literature on idiosyncratic shocks in imperfect markets settings predict an over-
accumulation of capital in the steady state as a precautionary motive. In practice,
it will be almost completely absorbed by country-fixed effects.
Macroeconomic variables
In a nutshell, the macroeconomic variables are extracted from the World Develop-
ment Indicators. The main variables of interest will be the GDP, average spread rate
faced by the private sector and level of domestic credit for both the private and the
banking sectors, the capital formation, bank deposits as well as important indica-
tors accounting for openness, access to international relief, government expenditures.
The indicators of financial development are constructed following the methodology
proposed by Levine aggregating through loans, purchases of non-equity securities,
trade credits and other accounts receivable given to the private sector, and sometimes
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credit to public enterprises. Focusing on the supply-side, I also consider domestic
credit provided by the banking sector including credit to the central government.
Despite predictable vulnerability, there are no real instruments designed to al-
leviate the economic slack in the aftermaths of these shocks. Insurance and aid
contributions are rarely able to provide sufficient ex-post resources. Furthermore,
both tend to respond to immediate needs and are not used to stimulate the eco-
nomic upturn. The amounts are negligible except for very few regions (California,
Florida and Japan do rely significantly on insurance) and events11. As such, reserves,
suspension of external debt payment and austerity plans are the main instruments
used in practice to provide liquidity for reconstruction. I will try to control for these
variables when assessing the recoveries in the aftermath of catastrophes.
B. Descriptive statistics
The dataset is a panel between 1980 and 2006 of approximately 180 countries12,
two third of them being actually in prey to either cyclones or earthquakes. The
impression that only poor countries are affected by these catastrophes is mislead-
ing. The panel of countries regularly hit by those natural disasters is heterogeneous
and include the richest economies but also developing economies or least-developed
countries. That being said, the vulnerability of the latter and the economic re-
silience of the former justify that ex-post exposure seems to be far larger for Haïti
or Philippines than Japan or Australia.
In this rectangular panel of 180 countries over 25 years, approximately 560 (resp.
520) country × year entries are red-letter observations with a non-zero exposure to a
cyclone (resp. earthquake). Naturally, these special years draw a very large spectrum
11international mobilizations following the Haïti earthquake in 2009 and the tsunami of December
2004 are to be considered as outliers.
12To sum up, United States, Central America, Chile, Peru, Japan, China, Philippines, Indonesia
experience frequent tremors due to their locations near the “Ring of Fire”. The other main threat
is the eurasian fault affecting India, Pakistan, Iran, central Asia, Turkey and Greece. Cyclones,
hurricanes or typhoons develop mainly in 5 basins (West-Pacific, East-Pacific, Indian, Australian,
Atlantic). Caribbean islands, Mexico, Philippines, Vietnam or Madagascar are affected on a regular
basis by very severe cyclonic storm. On the opposite, countries very close to the equator, inlands
or bordered by cold seas are not exposed.
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of shocks - both regarding the raw intensity and the number of people affected.
Table 1 shows the average proportion of the population affected by each threshold for
three samples of those shocks, the whole universe of entries, the subsample of entries
containing at least events of category 2 and the same subsample for category 4 events.
Two intuitions can be extracted from the table. First, intense catastrophes affect
also larger fractions of a country. Second, even for those events, the average affected
population is quite small relatively to the country population. The assumption that
the proportion is infinitesimal will only be violated by few catastrophic years in
Caribbean or Pacific islands.
Table 1: Descriptive statistics - the average catastrophic year
Proportion of the population affected (%)
Threshold cat. 0 cat. 1 cat. 2 cat. 3 cat. 4
Cyclones, Typhoons, Hurricanes
Conditional on occurrence (566) .41 .40 .21 .10 .05
Conditional on being cat. 2 (326) .59 .58 .37 .18 .08
Conditional on being cat. 4 (50) 1.11 1.09 1.00 .90 .51
Earthquakes
Conditional on occurrence (524) .18 .06 .04 .02 .01
Conditional on being cat. 2 (252) .28 .12 .09 .04 .02
Conditional on being cat. 4 (94) .40 .18 .14 .08 .06
The descriptive statistics aggregate events for the same country in the same year. Variables are
thus the sum over the year of indices for each catastrophe corrected by the month of occurrence.
In brackets, the number of year/country observations in which an event has occurred. Category
0,1,2,3,4 corresponds to cyclones classification and to moment magnitude of 5.5,6,6.5,7,7.5 at the
epicenter for earthquakes.
Countries in risky-prone area are quite likely to endure a natural disaster of
large economic magnitude. Based on EM-DAT, more than 60 (resp. 15) wind-
based events and 100 (resp. 20) earthquakes are associated with direct economic
damages larger than 1% (resp. 10%) of an affected country’s GDP. Using objective
data, the average exposure is of the same order of magnitude. In this section, I will
define a significant catastrophe as a disaster affecting more than .1% of a country
population. Almost 100 countries (for a total of 350 cyclones and 300 earthquakes)
have experienced a significant cyclone or earthquake. Naturally, small islands are
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over-represented but they do not account for the whole list. The map 5 represents
the sample affected by these significant catastrophes. Remark first that all regions
of the world are represented. Second, if this subsample of country differs from the
subsample of unaffected countries by their exposure to natural disasters, they do
not differ by economic or financial development as shown in figures F2 and F3 in the
appendix. To sum up, not all countries are affected but the subsample of exposed
economies seems to be representative.
Figure 5: Annual probability of being hit by a significant catastrophe (computed
over the period 1980-2006).
In this paper, I will assume that the objective measures capture capital losses.
That said, in practice, several channels help the propagation of an initial shock to
the rest of the economy. A disaster can destroy transportation facilities in a country
and freeze exports, leading to a quick deterioration of foreign debt levels. Agricul-
tural economies might suffer from important crop losses. Finally, the destruction of
public infrastructures might allegedly add to the initial chaos and incite agents to
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undertake actions detrimental to the community (looting, back-market...). In this
regard, both EM-DAT and the constructed measures are imperfect. Declarations
in EM-DAT are likely to be a lower bound of the real economic exposure. Indirect
losses are not reliably reported and the dataset suffers from censorship, truncation
and declaration biases. On the other hand, the objective exposure only accounts for
assets in the affected areas and does not include potential spillovers on direct sur-
roundings. Furthermore, part of the damages incurred by cyclones or earthquakes
is due to associated disasters - mudslides, floods, diseases.
IV. Empirical strategies and first results
A first and simple empirical test of the previous model is to study separately the
evolution of output in the aftermath of either cyclones or earthquakes. The output
is expected to be higher in the recovery of a large shock in frictionless economies
than in constrained environments. The unlimited access to credit should allow those
economies to allocate resources to deprived entrepreneurs. The second test focuses
on credit markets and their evolution during the economic slack. The final specifica-
tion extracts an estimation of financial frictions from the macroeconomic response of
economies and the structural equation shown in the theoretical part. The predicted
frictions are correlated with other indicators of financial development.
A. Evolution of output
Before turning to the main analysis, let me discuss the relationship between the
objective measures of exposure, the financial development and measures of direct
capital losses. In order to establish that financial development alleviates indirect
losses, it is important to assume that financial development does not mitigate di-
rect losses. The present study hinges on the assumption that capital losses may
be directly related to objective measures but not to the financial environment. A
simple story may contradict this hypothesis. Financial environment determines the
penetration of insurance in a country, which influences in turn the building require-
ments and prevention. An even simpler mechanism would come from the fact that
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Table 2: Declared damages predicted by objective measures and the financial devel-
opment
Role of credit on direct losses
Declared damages (% of GDP)
Specifications OLS OLS OLS fe OLS OLS OLS fe
Objective index 1.34 1.46 1.31
(cat 0) (.124)∗∗ (.231)∗∗ (.307)∗∗
Objective index 1.21 1.22 1.22
(cat 1) (.136)∗∗ (.248)∗∗ (.326)∗∗
FD .000 -.000
(.001) (.001)
FD×index -.299 .369
(cat 0) (.445) (.629)
FD×index .021 .544
(cat 1) (.473) (.660)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes
Country fixed effects Yes Yes
Observations 5426 5426 5426 5426 5426 5426
Significantly different than zero at † 90% confidence, ∗ 95% confidence, ∗∗ 99% confidence. The
observations are here country/year. Declared damages are divided by the current GDP. Variables
are the sum over the year of indices for each catastrophe corrected by the month of occurrence.
The indices correspond to the percentage of the population affected by a category 0 event (resp.
category 1), i.e. a cat. 0 (resp. cat. 1) typhoon or a magnitude 5.5 (resp. 6) earthquake for a
given year in a given country. Results are robust to the use of other thresholds. FD stands for
financial development, captured by the percentage of domestic credit over GDP averaged over the
period 1980-2006.
financially developed country are more risk-averse, more informed or have better
technologies.
This assumption is very strong and needs to be tested. To this purpose, I use
direct damages reported in EM-DAT for wind storms and earthquakes and see if
those direct economic losses can be predicted by objective exposure and financial
development. The observations are country/year and I compare aggregate declared
damages to the proportion of population hit by, at least, events of category 0 or 2
for a country over the year. Table 2 shows that objective estimates are very good
predictors of declared damages. 1% of the population affected by a category 0 event
generates direct losses of the order of 1 GDP point. Financial development does not
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play any role, either in changing the average reports nor the amplitude of capital
losses for a given level of natural threat. This analysis is robust to the addition
of macroeconomic controls and the use of other objective indicators. Overall, it
gives support to the hypothesis that financial development does not mitigate direct
damages - capital losses or immediate disruption.
Table 3: Impact of natural disasters on immediate output
Role of credit on indirect losses
GDP growth (t)
Specifications OLS OLS OLS AB
Shock × FD .028 .035 .031 .021
(.015)† (.015)∗ (.015)∗ (.009)∗
Shock -1.69 -2.08 -2.08 -1.32
(.726)∗ (.748)∗∗ (.761)∗∗ (.417)∗∗
Propensity × FD -.002 .000 -.001
(.001) (.001) (.001)
Propensity .058 .041 .040
(.091) (.093) (.093)
FD .003 .000 .001
(.003) (.004) (.004)
Gov. cons. (%,t− 1) -.053 -.052 -.267
(.017)∗∗ (.017)∗∗ (.120)∗
Reserves (%,t− 1) 3.36 3.35 12.6
(.785)∗∗ (.799)∗∗ (6.06)∗
Exports (%,t− 1) .026 .015 .001
(.006)∗∗ (.005)∗∗ (.005)
Cap. form. (%,t− 1) .071 .061
(.028)∗∗ (.074)
Current account (%,t− 1) -.025 .008
(.030) (.049)
GDP growth (t− 1) .339 .301 .272 .133
(.040)∗∗ (.044)∗∗ (.049)∗∗ (.048)∗∗
Year fixed effects Yes
Country fixed effects Yes
Observations 3180 3006 2797 2957
Significantly different than zero at † 90% confidence, ∗ 95% confidence, ∗∗ 99% confidence. (AB) is
a specification using Arellano-Bond System GMM estimator with 2-periods lags. The dependent
variable is the GDP growth for the ongoing year. The exposure is the annual exposed population
to earthquakes or wind-based events (of category 1) divided by the population. Propensities are
computed as the percentage of the population in risky zones at each date. FD stands for financial
development, captured by the percentage of domestic credit over GDP averaged over the period
1980-2006.
Let us turn to the analysis of indirect losses of output. Denote Ait the measure
of effective exposure to natural disasters, i.e. the percentage of the population
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exposed to a certain threshold e¯, yit the immediate ouput growth and Eit the expected
exposure. The average credit of the private sector over the period (as a percentage
of GDP) FDi will be used to approach the level of credit constraints in the country
i in line with Levine.
The basic equation which will be estimated is as follows:
yit = αA
i
t + γA
i
t × FDi + αeEit + γeEit × FDi + ζyit−1 + βXˆ it−1 + εit
This allows me to untangle the raw effect α of catastrophe from the credit-channel
effect γ. α captures the average effect of catastrophe whereas γ accounts for the
differential response to the shock along the financial development characteristic.
Several strategies may help to refine the definition of the counterfactual growth had
the economy not been disturbed by a shock. In a first specification, a broad set of
controls Xt−1 in t − 1 might prove sufficient to capture this counterfactual. I will
consider gross capital formation, current account, exports, government consumption
and reserves to account for shocks and government responses. In a second instance,
I will also add fixed effects to this dynamic estimation and replace the simple OLS
by the Arellano-Bond difference GMM estimator using lags up to 2 periods. The
choice of one or the other specification will not change the results, the same can be
noticed for the set of controls.
Table 3 documents a first stylized fact in line with the intuitions developed ear-
lier. The economic slowdown is larger in constrained economies. The interpretation
of the table is straightforward: on average, an additional percent of the economy
exposed to the equivalent of a category-1 cyclone13 triggers an immediate output
slack of approximately 1.5 points of GDP growth. This slowdown is alleviated by
.25 points of GDP growth for each additional 10 percent of domestic credit on av-
erage in the economy. Accordingly, the last decile economy in terms of financial
development loses 2 points of GDP growth while the first decile economy does not
suffer from any economic slack. Table T2 in the appendix displays the results for
different thresholds. In particular, the larger the thresholds the larger the effects.
13wind speed between 119 and 153 km/h.
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This pattern is not surprising. Putting aside the differential impact along the level
of financial institutions, the direct impact of having a percent of the population ex-
posed is naturally increasing in the threshold chosen. As documented in table T3, a
percent of the population affected by a cat-0 (resp. cat-1, cat-2, cat-3, cat-4, cat-5)
earthquake or typhoon creates a decline in the GDP growth of .99 points (resp. 1.17,
1.91, 2.00, 4.49, 14.2).
This stylized fact does not identify credit constraints as the channel through
which a credit-constrained economy lags behind. It can also indicate different re-
sponses in countries with a more developed financial environment due to unobserved
characteristics such as mitigation institutions or access to financial support14. In the
following tests, I focus more directly on the evolution of investment and the credit
markets following the catastrophe.
B. Evolution of investment, deposits and interest rates
In this part, I will analyze the evolution of investment and domestic credit in the
aftermath of a catastrophe. To this purpose, I will consider separately capital for-
mation, deposits and interest rate spreads. The following estimation is the basis for
the construction of the empirical impulse response:
yit =
L∑
l=0
(
αlA
i
t−l + γlA
i
t−l × FDi
)
+ ζyit−L + βXˆ
i
t−L + νi + µt + ε
i
t
As in the previous case, the estimation will be done with the Arellano-Bond
difference GMM estimator. The results are reported in table T1 in the appendix.
For readability concerns, the results are also plotted as impulse response functions for
two benchmark economies, the first-decile economy in terms of financial development
(10 percent of domestic credit over GDP over the period 1980-2006), and the last
decile economy (90 percent of domestic credit over GDP over the period 1980-2006)
in figure 6 for gross fixed capital formation, bank deposits and interest rate spreads.
Figure F1 in the appendix displays the evolutions of gross capital formation and
financial system deposits as robustness checks. The patterns are extremely similar.
14Remark that I control for international aid, remittances and debt rescheduling when reported.
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Figure 6: Separate evolutions of fixed capital formation, bank deposits and interest
rate spread (.01 corresponds to 1% or 100 bps) after a catastrophe (confidence in-
terval at 90%). Calibrated on two countries with: average financial development of
10% (left panel), average financial development of 90% (right panel).
Let us focus on the volume of credit and investment in the economy. There is
a gap both for the volume of deposits and the volume of fixed capital formation
between the first decile economy and the last decile economy in terms of financial
development. This gap corresponds roughly to 3 points of GDP during the 3-4 years
following the catastrophe. For each percent of the economy exposed, the additional
10% percents of loans provided to the private sector are associated with a rise of
investment of .20 points of GDP. In economies with few financial frictions, the invest-
ment rises slowly following a large shock and deposits increase significantly. On the
other hand, investment decreases in constrained economies and deposits stagnate.
These features are summed up in figure 6 (F1 in the appendix for slightly different
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definition of capital formation or deposits) for the aftermaths of a catastrophe of
category 1 affecting 1% of the population. Whereas the private credit reacts posi-
tively to a shock on capital in an economy with a high initial level of credit, credit
plunges in environments with low initial levels. Both responses fade away after 3-4
years.
The analysis of volumes seems to be supported by the evolution of prices. Fo-
cusing on the spread rate between lending rate and treasury bills, figure 6 shows an
increase of this spread in countries with high financial frictions. Those economies
experience an increase of this spread up to 100 bps for a catastrophe of category 1
affecting 1% of the population. This additional premium as for the volume of invest-
ment disappears after 4 years. The picture is very different for financially-developed
economies. Each additional percent of loans provided to the private sector reduces
this increase by 10 bps. Those economies thus experience a stagnation of spread
rates.
The results are consistent with the interpretation that affected entrepreneurs
might fall in a credit trap in economies where borrowing constraints are very tight.
Let us remark that the back-of-the-envelope computation of capital losses necessary
to justify a decrease of 2% of GDP (associated with a catastrophe of category 1
affecting 1% of the population) is in line with the level of additional investment
observed in financially developed economies. The increase of investment following a
1%-catastrophe in countries without credit frictions is estimated to be of the same
order of magnitude of capital losses - approximately 10% of a country’s GDP shared
among the first 3-4 years after the shock.
Overall, the separate evolutions of the level of investment, the output and the
price of capital corroborate the dynamics suggested by the theoretical framework.
Notice that these results are robust to other definitions of financial development,
taking the initial value of domestic credit rather than the average for instance,
or credit supplied by banking institutions. Furthermore, they are not driven by
a higher economic development in general in financially-developed economies, as
the regressions are robust to the addition of the interaction of shocks with GDP
per capita. I do not account for redistribution performed by a central government
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here. Naturally, the state is an important actor alleviating misallocation of capital,
technology or labor in the economy. This channel as well as access to international
funds are left for future work.
C. Structural estimation
The previous empirical specifications point to a large economic slack in credit con-
strained economies. In this section, I propose a direct estimation of the theoretical
model in order to establish the access to credit as the prominent factor in the re-
covery. To this purpose, consider the delay-equation extracted from the theoretical
framework.
I it+1 = ζI
i
t + ζkK˜
i
t + Et0 [ζ ieEit0 ] + ν
i
t
Investment It+1 is delayed for economies with large financial frictions and Et0 [ζ ieEit0 ]
captures the extent to which investment lags behind between t+1 and t for a shock
having intervened at t0 (t− 1 or before). For simplicity, I will assume the following
functional form for the disturbance term:
Et0 [ζ ieEit0 ] = χ
i
e
8∑
τ=1
Eit−τ
The tested equation will thus be:
I it+1 = ζI
i
t + ζkK˜
i
t + χ
i
e
8∑
τ=1
Eit−τ + ν
i
t
and the test will be performed with the Arellano-Bond difference GMM estimator
with 2 lags, considering gross (fixed) capital formation for I, normalized GDP per
capita to capture K and the sum of the population affected by a category 1 event
during the 8 years including t−1. Following these estimations, I extract the country-
level estimations of χie. Table T4 shows the estimates of χie for a panel of 60 countries
having suffered from at least two category-1 events between 1980 and 2006. Remark
that the United States, Iceland and Canada are among the best students while
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Bhutan, Madagascar, and Fiji are the countries in which investment is the most de-
layed. For more surprising results, Nepal and Japan inherit from unexpected values
- potentially inflated for the latter, deflated for the former. Comparing this measure
with different indicators of financial development, table 4 illustrates that it is nega-
tively correlated with the average private credit in the economy (whether supplied by
banks alone or together with other financial institutions). In parallel, the measure is
positively correlated with the concentration of banks and negatively with insurance
penetration but only for non-life premiums. Countries where investment is delayed
have small financial and insurance sectors (in particular for non-life products) and
a high bank concentration. These correlations are also plotted in figure 7.
Table 4: Correlations between the parameter extracted from the structural model
and other indicators of financial development
Structural parameter χie
Computed with Gross Gross fixed
capital formation capital formation
correlation p-value obs. correlation p-value obs.
Private domestic -.294 (.029) 55 -.344 (.011) 54
credit (banks)
Private domestic -.337 (.011) 55 -.377 (.005) 54
credit (all institutions)
Concentration .304 (.035) 48 .265 (.071) 47
of banks
Non-life -.237 (.198) 31 -.400 (.031) 29
insurance volumes
Life -.022 (.903) 31 -.061 (.749) 29
insurance volumes
The indicators of financial development are the average over the period 1980-2006 of credit supplied
by banks to the private sector, credit supplied by all financial institutions, concentration of banks
and premiums volume to GDP for non-life and life insurance. The number of observations are thus
limited by the availability of those indicators and the computation of the structural parameters
for which I keep countries having been affected at least twice during the period. The first column
depicts estimations computed using the evolution of gross capital formation, the second one uses
gross fixed capital formation.
In the next lines, I will go beyond the raw correlation and discuss the shape
of these figures, comment the small number of observations and explain absurd
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observations.
Figure 7: Correlations between the measured lag in investment in the aftermaths of
catastrophes and classic indicators, i.e. domestic private credit supplied by banks,
by banks and other financial institutions, bank concentration and insurance pene-
tration.
Financial development plotted in figure 7 seems to be a hyperbolic function of
the estimated level of frictions in the economy. In an economy where all agents
willing to borrow are constrained, κ can be interpreted as the leverage which drives
the level of domestic credit supplied to the private sector. In parallel, χie can roughly
be expressed as a polynomial function of 1
1−κ . This simple intuition gives support
to the empirical observation. The analysis of the curves for bank concentration or
insurance premiums would be more adventurous.
Two different sources contribute to the attrition in the estimation of the rela-
tionship between each country’s χie and state-of-the-art indicators of financial devel-
opment. First, these indicators are not always available in particular for insurance
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premiums and bank concentration. Second, only economies having suffered from
two shocks between 1980 and 2006 are kept for the estimation - which reduces dras-
tically the panel of countries (almost half of the sample of countries affected by large
catastrophes disappear).
Theoretically, χie should range from 0 to 1. The estimations of χie abstracts
away from these limits in two extreme cases. When the recovery is even faster
than predicted for an economy without frictions, χie is negative. Colombia and,
less surprisingly, the United States are in this situation. These economies might
receive large capital flows from the rest of the world, explaining then the observed
investment boost. At the other end of the spectrum, some economies recover slower
than predicted in the worst-case scenario. Panama and Bhutan are among those
countries. Other indirect repercussions than credit squeeze might explain this pat-
tern, state bankruptcy, exacerbated tensions and long business disruptions are good
candidates.
V. Conclusion
This article has explored theoretically and empirically the intuition that financial
frictions amplify the economic slack following natural disasters. In credit-constrained
environments, the evolution of domestic credit follows the opposite pattern of what
the optimal response of the economy would be. This distortion has repercussions
on immediate recovery and tends to freeze the catch-up process. Investment lags
behind during 3 to 5 years.
The macroeconomic analysis of a large panel of economies should theoretically
alleviate concerns about external validity of the results. That being said, the extrac-
tion of underlying credit constraints in the aftermaths of cyclones and earthquakes
might capture very different fundamentals than those at stake in a normal and quiet
state. In particular, international assistance and heavy state intervention might
drive the estimates far from fundamentals of the private markets.
While I exploit capital markets imperfections in this study, the results point
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out the importance of unconstrained reallocation mechanisms in general. The state
capacity to redistribute resources might alleviate the distortion induced by failing
capital markets. In practice, distorted capital markets are often accompanied by
weak states and it is difficult to untangle the failure of decentralized markets from
the failure of the government. Finally, labor markets should also play a role as a
large fraction of the population might experience business disruption and partial
unemployment. Further research could examine the importance of labor market
frictions and determine which imperfections trigger the largest economic distortions.
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A Proofs
Proof. Proposition II..1
The Lagrangian associated to this program is the following:
Lt =u (−θt − kt+1 + f (kt) + (1− δ) kt + (1 + rt−1)θt−1) + βVt+1 (kt+1, θt)
+ µt (θt + κkt+1)
The first-order conditions give us immediately
∂Lt
∂θt
= −u′ (ct) + β ∂Vt+1∂θt + µt
∂Lt
∂kt+1
= −u′ (ct) + β ∂Vt+1∂kt+1 + κµt
Applying the envelope theorem,{
∂Vt+1
∂θt
= (1 + rt)u
′
(ct+1)
∂Vt+1
∂kt+1
=
(
1− δ + f ′ (kt+1)
)
u
′
(ct+1)
In conclusion, when the credit constraint does not bind,{
f
′
(kt+1) = rt + δ
u
′
(ct) = β (1 + rt)u
′
(ct+1)
When the credit constraint binds,{
θt ≥ −κkt+1
u
′
(ct) = β (1 + r
∗
t )u
′
(ct+1)
where r∗t = rt +
f
′
(kt+1)−δ−rt
1−κ .
Proof. Proposition II..2 The steady state is a fixed point for the distribution of
(wi, ki, r) in the economy. Let us consider that a certain allocation is a fixed point.
Assume that the mass of constrained agents is not equal to 0. This hypothesis
translates into the following observation. As the consumption distribution should
be a fixed point, this imposes that the mean of γ ln (β(1 + r∗t )) should be zero. As
r∗ > r for unconstrained agents, it imposes first that (1 + r∞)β < 1. Unconstrained
agents will over-consume immediately. Accordingly, from one period to the other,
consumption of some constrained agents will individually increase; consumption of
all unconstrained agents will individually decrease and their wealth will follow the
same pattern. This imposes that the richest agents who see their wealth decrease
should be replaced by poorer agents who see their wealth increase for the distribution
of wealth to be fixed. As all unconstrained agents see their wealth decrease, this is
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only possible if some constrained agents become the richest from one period to the
other.
Consequently, going back to our initial hypothesis, no constrained agents can
exist at the steady state.
If the steady state distribution can not allow for constrained agents, then the
Euler equation brings immediately
∫
i
ci∞di −
∫
i
ci∞di = γ ln (β (1 + r∞)) = 0 which
translates into β (1 + r∞) = 1. This imposes that not only the distribution of
consumption but also each individual consumption is fixed. In addition, the level of
capital is not only fixed but equal across agents ki∞ = f
′−1 (r∞ + δ).{
r∞ + δ = f
′
(k∞)
β (1 + r∞) = 1
In the steady state, agents are homogeneous in terms of capital accumulation.
Proof. Lemma II..3
The proof will be organized as follows. First, I will determine the allocation of
households once they have grown out of the credit constraints. Then, I will determine
the dynamics for those constrained households during the first periods (while they
are constrained) and find the condition under which the constraint binds.
Let us start then from the optimization of unconstrained households. Suppose
that households inheriting kt and θt−1 are unconstrained under a fixed interest rate
r∞. They will never be constrained in the future following the turnpike property
established in complete markets. The level of capital that they accumulate will be
kt+1 = f
′−1(r∞+ δ) = k∞. In addition, the evolution of consumption will follow the
same pattern for everyone ct = ct+1 = c∞. Consequently,
c∞ + k∞ + θt = (1− δ)kt + f(kt) + (1 + r∞)θt−1
c∞ + k∞ + θt+1 = (1− δ)k∞ + f(k∞) + (1 + r∞)θt
...
c∞ + k∞ + θt+τ−1 = (1− δ)k∞ + f(k∞) + (1 + r∞)θt+τ−2
c∞ + k∞ + θt+τ = (1− δ)k∞ + f(k∞) + (1 + r∞)θt+τ−1
...
Multiplying each row by (1 + r∞)−τ and summing over these equations,
∞∑
τ=0
(1 + r∞)−τ [c∞ + k∞ + θt+τ ] =
∞∑
τ=1
(1 + r∞)−τ [(1− δ)k∞ + f(k∞) + (1 + r∞)θt+τ−1]
+ (1− δ)kt + f(kt) + (1 + r∞)θt−1
Under the assumption that limτ→∞(1 + r∞)−τθt+τ = 0,
1 + r∞
r∞
[c∞ + k∞] =
1
r∞
[(1− δ)k∞ + f(k∞)] + (1− δ)kt + f(kt) + (1 + r∞)θt−1
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which becomes the intertemporal budget constraint:
c∞ = w∞ +
r∞
1 + r∞
[(1− δ)kt + f(kt)] + r∞θt−1
where w∞ = f(k∞)−(r∞−δ)k∞1+r∞ . This last equation coupled with kt+1 = f
′−1(r∞+ δ) =
k∞ fix the capital stock and consumption from t onwards.
The overall dynamics is composed of a first segment in which agents are con-
strained and try to grow as quickly as possible out of the credit frictions, and a
second segment where consumption and capital stock are both fixed. The argument
developed above allows us to capture the dynamics on the second segment. Solving
the dynamics on the first segment is possible and necessitate a recursive process.
To this purpose, consider the first period for which agents become unconstrained
t = τ + 1. The consumption at this period can simply be written as:
cτ+1 = c0(w(kτ+1)) = w∞ +
r∞
1 + r∞
w(kτ+1)
where w(x) = (1− δ)x+f(x)−κ(1+r∞)x is the available revenue before we deduct
future consumption as a function of capital in the constrained segment. Since, by
definition, agents are constrained at t = τ , κkτ+1 + θτ = 0 and the dynamic system
can be written as:{
cτ + (1− κ)kτ+1 = w(kτ )
cτ = cτ+1 − γ ln
(
1 + β
1−κ(f
′
(kτ+1)− f ′(k∞))
)
Substituting cτ in the first equation,
(1− κ)kτ+1 + cτ+1 − γ ln
(
1 +
β
1− κ(f
′
(kτ+1)− f ′(k∞))
)
= w(kτ )
Using the characterization of future consumption,
(1− κ)kτ+1 +w∞ + r∞
1 + r∞
w(kτ+1)− γ ln
(
1 +
β
1− κ(f
′
(kτ+1)− f ′(k∞))
)
= w(kτ )
(Ro)
This equation determines then both kτ+1 and cτ = w(kτ )− (1− κ)kτ+1 = c1(w(kτ ))
as a function of the inherited revenue w(kτ ) and indirectly the state variable kτ .
This process recursively defines kτ−(n+1) as a function of kτ−n. Suppose that we
have cτ−n = cn(w(kτ−n)). At period τ − (n + 1), agents are still constrained, they
choose kτ−n such that
(1− κ)kτ−n + cn(w(kτ−n))− γ ln
(
1 +
β
1− κ(f
′
(kτ−n)− f ′(k∞))
)
= w(kτ−(n+1))
(Rn)
This equation defines both kτ−n and cτ−n as a function of w(kτ−(n+1)) and solves the
problem backward.
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The agent is constrained as long as the capital reachable with the previous equa-
tion is still lower than the optimal level k∞.
Since the term γ ln
(
1 + β
1−κ(f
′
(kt+1)− f ′(k∞))
)
is always positive except when
the capital reaches its unconstrained level, the following inequality is a necessary
and sufficient condition for being constrained.
w(kt)− ct+1 < (1− κ)k∞
Proof. Lemma II..5 The proof of this proposition is straightforward. Indeed, the
second and third equations are just linear approximations at first order of the capital
optimization and the Euler equation. The first equation is a linear approximation of
the budget constraint of households where Θt = −µ((1+r)θt−1+θt) is considered as
given (it is, in particular, independent of the interest rate rt). The actual program
of the unaffected households is the following:
ct + kt+1 = (1− δ)kt + f(kt) + Θt
kt+1 = f
′−1(rt + δ)
ct = ct+1 − γ ln (β(1 + rt))
As stated above, linearization at first-order gives us:
c˜t + k˜t+1 =
(
1− δ + f ′(k∞)
)
k˜t + εt
k˜t+1 = 1/f
′′
(f−1 (r∞ + δ)) r˜t
c˜t = c˜t+1 − γr˜t
where x˜ is the distance of variable x to its steady state value. Replacing 1 − δ +
f
′
(k∞) = (1+ r∞) and η∞ = −1/f ′′ (f−1 (r∞ + δ)) in the first and second equations
above gives us the result.
Proof. Proposition II..6 This proposition is a direct application of the two previous
lemmas. Denote x and x respectively the variable x for initial winners - the happy
lot - and initial losers - the unhappy few. Aggregate variables X can be written as
µx+(1−µ)x. Denote k the capital accumulation of affected agents which constitutes
a separate process. Variables will be normalized around the steady state values.
The budget constraint in the economy can be written:
C˜t + K˜t+1 =
(
1− δ + f ′(k∞)
)
K˜t + µ
[
f(kt)− f(k∞)− f ′(k∞)(kt − k∞)
]
After a minor simplification,
C˜t + K˜t+1 = (1 + r∞)K˜t + µ
[
f(kt)− f(k∞)− f ′(k∞)(kt − k∞)
]
The last term can be understood as the cost on the aggregate wealth of imperfections
driving some agents away from the optimal path.
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The aggregate capital at each period can be written as the sum of the two terms
extracted from individual maximizations.
K˜t+1 = −η∞r˜t + µ [kt+1 − k∞]
Finally, the Euler equations give us:
C˜t = C˜t+1 − γr˜t − γ ln
(
1 +
β
1− κ(f
′
(kt+1)− f ′(k∞))
)
Substituting r˜t,
C˜t = C˜t+1 +
γ
η∞
K˜t+1 − µ
[
γ ln
(
1 +
β
1− κ(f
′
(kt+1)− f ′(k∞))
)
+
γ
η∞
(kt+1 − k∞)
]
Overall, the dynamics is entirely determined by the following system:{
C˜t + K˜t+1 = (1 + r∞)K˜t + µ
[
f(kt)− f(k∞)− f ′(k∞)(kt − k∞)
]
C˜t = C˜t+1 +
γ
η∞ K˜t+1 − µ
[
γ ln
(
1 + β
1−κ(f
′
(kt+1)− f ′(k∞))
)
+ γ
η∞ (kt+1 − k∞)
]
Without any credit constraints, the error terms in both equations disappear and the
dynamics is a representative-agent dynamics.
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B Tables and figures
Figure F1: Separate evolutions of capital formation, financial system deposits after a
catastrophe (confidence interval at 90%). Calibrated on two countries with: average
financial development of 10% (left panel), average financial development of 90%
(right panel).
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Figure F2: Comparing the subsample of affected countries to unaffected countries
along GDP per capita.
Figure F3: Comparing the subsample of affected countries to unaffected countries
along financial development.
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Table T1: Impact of natural disasters on the evolutions of capital formation, deposits
and spread
Gross fixed Gross Bank Fin. Spread
cap. form. cap. form. deposits deposits rate
Specifications AB AB AB AB AB
Shock -1.19 -1.15 -1.95 -1.88 22.3
(t) (.521)∗ (.826) (1.43) (1.48) (19.9)
Shock -2.06 -1.75 -1.64 -1.76 84.2
(t− 1) (.756)∗∗ (.975)† (1.18)† (1.23) (45.6)†
Shock -2.42 -2.46 -1.38 -1.52 127
(t− 2) (.848)∗∗ (.1.14)∗ (.965) (.990) (59.0)∗
Shock -1.85 -1.89 -1.01 -1.12 117
(t− 3) (.986) (1.34) (.925) (.948) (58.0)∗
Shock -1.36 -.877 -1.43 -1.55 98.5
(t− 4) (.975) (.975) (1.27) (1.33) (59.8)†
Shock -.671 -1.15 -.039 -.148 19.1
(t− 5) (.742) (.945) (1.42) (1.47) (56.8)
Shock -.797 -.567 .634 -34.0
(t− 6) (.717) (.765) (.983) (1.01) (41.6)
Shock × FD .013 .006 .006 .007 -.055
(t) (.009) (.012) (.004)† (.004) (.047)
Shock × FD .023 .015 .005 .005 -.171
(t− 1) (.011)∗ (.013) (.003) (.003) (.103)†
Shock × FD .025 .020 .005 .006 -.241
(t− 2) (.015)† (.014) (.003)∗ (.003)∗ (.141)†
Shock × FD .016 .020 .005 .005 -.218
(t− 3) (.012) (.015) (.002)∗ (.002)∗ (.138)
Shock × FD .017 .025 .004 .004 -.191
(t− 4) (.016) (.015)† (.003) (.003) (.146)
Shock × FD .019 .033 .000 .001 -.034
(t− 5) (.015) (.017)† (.004) (.004) (.144)
Shock × FD .007 .010 .000 .000 .084
(t− 6) (.013) (.016) (.003) (.003) (.096)
Additional controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Test for AR(1) (Pr > z) .012 .005 .000 .000 .237
Test for AR(2) (Pr > z) .183 .281 .010 .009 .992
Observations 2346 2430 1826 1826 1549
Significantly different than zero at † 90% confidence, ∗ 95% confidence, ∗∗ 99% confidence. (AB) is
a specification using Arellano-Bond System GMM estimator with 2-periods lags. The dependent
variable are the gross capital formation, the gross fixed capital formation for the ongoing year as
a share of GDP, the bank and financial system deposits as a share of GDP, and the spread rate
(lending rate minus deposit rate). The exposure is the annual exposed population to earthquakes or
wind-based events (of category 1) divided by the population. FD stands for financial development,
captured by the percentage of domestic credit over GDP averaged over the period 1980-2006. The
attrition is explained by the lack of reliable data on financial indicators for almost 1/3 of the
countries.
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Table T2: Robustness checks for immediate output with different measures of expo-
sure
Role of credit on indirect losses - robustness checks
GDP growth t
Specifications OLS AB OLS AB OLS AB
Shock × FD .031 .025
(cat. 0) (.015)∗ (.010)∗
Shock -1.92 -1.44
(cat. 0) (.72)∗∗ (.43)∗∗
Shock × FD .045 .026
(cat. 2) (.020)∗ (.014)∗
Shock -3.59 -1.77
(cat. 2) (1.0)∗∗ (.69)†
Shock × FD .008 -.001
(sum) (.006) (.006)
Shock -.481 -.105
(sum) (.25)† (.22)
Propensity × FD -.002 -.000 -.001
(.002) (.001) (.001)
Propensity .048 .017 .014
(.095) (.091) (.091)
GDP growth (t− 1) .272 .134 .272 .133 .273 .132
(.05)∗∗ (.05)∗∗ (.05)∗∗ (.05)∗∗ (.05)∗∗ (.05)∗∗
Additional controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2797 2957 2797 2957 2797 2957
Significantly different than zero at † 90% confidence, ∗ 95% confidence, ∗∗ 99% confidence. (AB) is
a specification using Arellano-Bond System GMM estimator with 2-periods lags. The dependent
variable is the GDP growth for the ongoing year. The exposure is the annual exposed population to
earthquakes or wind-based events (of category 0 and 2) divided by the population and the sum of
energy weighted by the local density. Propensities are computed as the percentage of the population
in risky zones at each date. The set of additional controls include gross capital formation, current
account, reserves, government expenditures, credit and exports at t − 1. FD stands for financial
development, captured by the percentage of domestic credit over GDP averaged over the period
1980-2006.
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Table T3: Impact of different thresholds for natural disasters on immediate output
Indirect losses - robustness checks
GDP growth t
Specifications OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Shock (cat. 0) -.994
(.414)∗
Shock (cat. 1) -1.17
(.433)∗∗
Shock (cat. 2) -1.91
(.466)∗∗
Shock (cat. 3) -2.00
(.475)∗∗
Shock (cat. 4) -4.49
(1.21)∗∗
Shock (cat. 5) -14.2
(7.30)∗
Shock (sum) -.204
(.085)∗
Additional controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2797 2797 2797 2797 2797 2797 2797
Significantly different than zero at † 90% confidence, ∗ 95% confidence, ∗∗ 99% confidence. The
results are shown omitting the coefficients for the control variables (growth, GDP per capita,
current account, government consumption, credit, reserves, capital formation, imports and FDI
inflows at t − 1) and propensities to be affected. The exposure is the annual exposed population
to earthquakes or wind-based events (of category 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5) divided by the population and
the sum of energy weighted by the local density (sum).
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Table T4: Underlying parameters extracted from the structural model
Structural parameter χie
Country (ISO) Value Country (ISO) Value Country (ISO) Value
ECU -0.27 DMA 0.13 MOZ 0.21
COL -0.13 ATG 0.14 JAM 0.22
NZL -0.04 AZE 0.15 CHL 0.22
NIC -0.02 ROU 0.15 VCT 0.23
USA -0.01 GRC 0.16 VNM 0.26
ABW 0 COM 0.16 PER 0.27
DJI 0 HKG 0.17 LAO 0.3
ISL 0.01 BRB 0.17 EGY 0.34
CYP 0.03 VUT 0.18 TUR 0.38
BEN 0.03 TON 0.18 SWZ 0.43
SLB 0.03 GTM 0.18 ALB 0.44
NPL 0.04 MWI 0.18 AND 0.46
BLZ 0.05 MUS 0.18 FJI 0.46
IRL 0.05 MDG 0.18 KGZ 0.47
DOM 0.06 PRI 0.19 TTO 0.48
KOR 0.09 BHS 0.19 PNG 0.51
CAN 0.11 SLV 0.2 MDA 0.66
MEX 0.11 KNA 0.2 CPV 0.81
GRD 0.11 DZA 0.2 BTN 0.97
PHL 0.12 CRI 0.21 PAN 1.22
HND 0.13 TJK 0.21
LCA 0.13 JPN 0.21
These values have been computed using the evolution of gross fixed capital formation as a proxy
for investment. Note that some of these coefficients are negative. Remember that they represent
the area between the frictionless case and the actual evolution. A negative area could be explained
by an even faster recovery than predicted by the frictionless case.
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Figure F4: Overview of the population density in 2005 and cyclone risk since 1980.
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